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SUMMARY 
The AID-sponsored Rural Savings Mobilization Project in the 
Dominican Republic, with technical assistance frqm the Ohio state 
University (OSU), has been a source of unusual challenges, 
lessons, and achievements, and constitutes a most interestin~ 
experiment in rural financial market development. This report 
discusses the project's background, its innovative design, 
objectives and activities, its flexible style of implementation, 
its successful results and the problems still unsolved, and 
derives useful lessons from the experience. It shows that 
financial savings can be successfully mobilized in the rural areas 
of low income countries and that the institutions involved can be 
thereby strengthened, but that the task is not easy. 
The Dominican Republic's rapid financial development of the 
1960s and 1970s was characterized by a strong urban bias. The 
banking network had been concentrated in the two major cities, a 
small proportion of the rural population had had access to formal 
financial services, and the ratio of agricultural credit to output 
had been very low. Moreover, this pias has been accentuated by 
the recent financial crisis. Also, Banco Agricola's 31 branches 
had offered only loans, but not deposit facilities. This bank had 
been an incomplete intermediary, disbursing foreign and Central 
Bank funds, on concessionary terms, and as a result it lacked 
financial v~ability and did not offer farmers permanent and 
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reliable services. This institutional design as well as frequent 
political intrusions led to severe default problems. During the 
recent financial crisis, moreover, Banco Agricola lost its access 
to public-sector funds and could not even perform its usual credit 
functions. 
By the early 1980s, AID's dissatisfaction with donor efforts 
to improve the country's agricultural credit system led to the 
consideration of a rural financial market reform project. As the 
political constraints on interest-rate reforms became clear and on 
osu advice, however, AID decided to rather sponsor a pilot rural 
savings mobilization project, based on the notion that the rural 
population could generate funds to meet some agricultural credit 
needs, if convenient, low-cost deposit facilities were offered. 
The main objective has been to improve the supply of finan-
cial services--deposits and loans--in the rural areas, by streng-
thening institutions and promoting changes in policies and 
procedures. The activities designed included pilot savings 
mobilization campaigns by Banco Agricola and selected credit 
unions, the improvement of the financial management of these 
institutions, the establishment of a Dominican research capability 
on financial-market issues, and dissemination of the results. The 
purposes were to demonstrate that rural savings exist and can be 
successfully mobilized, to learn about mobilization techniques, 
and to promote policy reforms. 
The establishment of deposit facilities at selected branches 
of Banco Agricola involved complex preparations. support from the 
bank's management and staff had to be generated, procedures had to 
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be designed, authorization from the monetary authorities was 
required, and a publicity campaign was launched. In July, 1983, 
passbook savings accounts and time deposits were offered at a 
first branch. One at a time, these services were to be eventually 
offered in four more branches. Soon, however, the political 
decision was made to gradually expand the system to all of the 
Bank's branches and the osu team had to deal with the issue of the 
optimum speed of expansion of this service. While, as originally 
designed, deposit mobilization was to be an experiment, at a few 
branches the change of approach created new challenges for osu 
and the bank. 
Soon it became clear that rural financial savings did exist 
and that the bank was attracting them, but that even at a small 
scale of operations this was not an easy task. It was expected 
that deposit mobilization would create imbalances and force 
institutional reforms for Banco Agricola, but these second-
generation problems became more acute with the rapid expansion of 
the system. The project had indeed been designed as a Trojan 
Horse, to promote policy and organizational changes from within, 
in response to disequilibria created. The willingness of the 
bank's management to rapidly expand the effort was fortunately 
matched by a desire to support the reforms required, buy these 
could not be improvised. Changes have included a new information 
management system, the introduction of microcomputers, new client 
classification and portfolio management criteria, renewed collec-
tion efforts, a new human-resource strategy, and lots of staff 
training. 
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Preparation efforts at the four credit unions selected were 
even more arduous, given their weak institutional base. on the 
other hand, a more flexible interest-rate structure was adopted. 
The initial build-up of excess liquidity, which has been a problem 
at Banco Agricola was rapidly resolved, as managers became more 
. adept in credit analysis. They are now facing a substantial 
unsatisfied demand for credit, even at high interest rates. At 
the same time, thei~ new procedures and improved image have 
resulted in significant reductions in borrower delinquency. 
Three generations of research projects by Dominican insti-
tutions, designed and evaluated at an equal number of major 
workshops, have been the main vehicle' for research and dissemi-
nation, in addition to numerous minor workshops, seminars, and 
lectures. About 120 reports and publications have resulted from 
the project. Research results, public discussion, and operational 
innovations have been a powerful instrument for policy dialogue 
and problem solving. 
Achievements at Banco Agricola have included the establish-
ment of the savings Mobilization Department, numerous organiza-
tional changes, a new data-processing system and the use of 
microcomputers, and a much improved recuperation record. The new 
deposit mobilization activity was introduced with the addition of 
only three employees to the Bank's total staff. Interest rates 
charged on loans were revised up to the maximum allowed to improve 
profitabi~ity. By October, 1985 deposit services were being 
offered at 29 branches, 20,813 accounts had been opened, DR$ 7.0 
million (US 2.4 million) had been mobilized, while the system 
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continued to expand rapidly. The average balance of a passbook 
account of DR$ 194 (US$ 67) suggests that numerous deposits from 
small savers had been captured. Deposit mobilization among the 
four credit unions has also been very successful. In little more 
than a year, savings deposits have increased ten times in two of 
them, and in substantial amounts for the other two. (Towards the 
end of 1985 they had mobilized DRS 1.65 million--over half-a-
million us dollars). Borrower delinquency, which had ranged 
between 45 to 71 percent of their portfolio (in three of them), 
had declined to the range o~ 7 to 15 percent. 
Many lessons have been learned. It has been confirmed that 
rural savings can be attracted by financial institutions and that 
a demand for rural deposit facilities exist. For an institution 
with an established network of branches (like Banco Agricola) this 
can be done at a relatively low marginal cost. The task, however, 
is not easy. A complex preparation and the mobilization of 
political support are required. New dilemmas about strategy and 
organization have to be faced and second-generation problems 
solved. The introduction of deposit mobilization activities 
creates imbalances and brings to light deficiencies that 
necessitate correction, leading to a global restructuring of the 
intermediary. This may be the Project's most important 
contribution. 
- v -
RURAL SAVINGS MOBILIZATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 
CHALLENGES, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AND LESSONS 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega and Jeffrey Poyol/ 
r. Introduction 
For over two years1 the Rural Savings Mobilization Projecc 
in the Dominican Republic has been a source of comple~ cnallenges, 
numerous lessons, and remarkable achievements, that nave outrun 
its initial modest targets. Sponsored by the u.s. A~ency for 
International Development (both the Mission in Santo Do~Ln~o 
and the Bureau for Science and Technology in Washin9ton), Lt has 
involved The Ohio state University (OSU) as well as the centra1 
Bank, Banco Agricola (public agricultural development bank), and 
numerous other Dominican institutions. Given the inno~ations 
introduced in its design, its flexible style of implementation~ 
and its exceptionally successful results, the Rural savings 
Mobilization Project represents one of the most interesting 
experiments in rural financial market development anywhere in 
Latin America. 
This report illustrates how it is possible, if the required 
ingredients are available, to successfully mobilize financial 
savings in the rural areas of low income countries, and tnereby 
strengthen the financial irtstitutions involved. At the same 
time, it highlights the complexity of financial develo~~e~t and 
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the subtleties of the policy reforms, institutional transforma-
tions, and technological innovations that are required for the 
task. It recognizes how little the profession, in general, knows 
about the operations of rural financial markets and how long the 
road towards an efficient provision of financial services in the 
rural areas of the low income countries will be. It suggests 
that the approaches being tested by the osu group in the field 
may be among the most promising. 
The report includes several sections. First, it discusses 
the background of the Project, both from the perspective of the 
financing of rural activities in the Dominican Republic and of 
USAID's involvement in this field. Second, it presents the 
Project's objectives and the nature of the activities designed 
to achieve them. Third, it examines the process of Project 
implementation. This is a section about "how events never 
evolve the way it had been planned" and "why it is essential to 
be flexible and not to insist in strictly adjusting to original 
plans." Fourth, the report also describes the results and 
achievements to date. Fifth, some problems still to be solved 
and an agenda for the future are discussed, while the report 
finally suggests the nature of some of the lessons learned. 
II. Background: The Financing of Agriculture 
During the 1960s and most of the 1970s, the Dominican 
Republic experienced a significant degree of financial deepening. 
This financial development was reflected by the establishment of 
numerous and diverse institutions, the provision of a wider range 
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of financial services, the rapid growch, in real terms, of funds 
mobllized and of credit volumes, and the increasing ratios of 
financial assets with respect to the gross domestic product.l/ 
This financial progress was made possible by rapid economic 
growth and by relative exchange-rate stability and absence of 
inflation, which resulted from the openness of the economy and 
cautious fiscal, credit, and monetary policies, targeted to keep 
the external value of the D.R. peso stable. 
Despite this progress, the Dominican Republic did not reach 
the degree of financial deepening achieved by some other coun-
tries in the region and continued to rely heavily on foreign 
savings in order to finance domestic investment.l/ Access to 
abundant foreign financial assistance and Central Bank redis-
counting, on concessionary terms, reduced the need for and 
weakened the willingness of domestic intermediaries to mobilize 
voluntary deposits from the public. Moreover, financial markets 
are still highly fragmented, largely as a result of excessive and 
detailed regulation. The transaction costs imposed on most 
market participants appear to be very high and vary significantly 
across depositor, borrower, and lender classes. In addition, the 
loan portfolios of regulated financial institutions show a very 
high degree of concentration: among those few with access to 
loans, a small proportion has captured a very large share of the 
amounts loaned. All of these deficiencies have been accentuated 
by the contraction of the regulated segment of the financial mar-
ket that has resulted from the most recent economic difficulties. 
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The most conspicuous deficiency of the Dominican financial 
development has been its pronounced urban bias. The very large 
network of re?ulated and non-regulated financial institutions has 
been concentrated in the two major cities: santo Domingo and 
Santiago. As a result, only a very small proportion of the rural 
population has had access to institutional credit. It has been 
estimated that less than 20 percent of the country's agricultural 
producers have ~eceived institutional loans. The proportion that 
has had access to a permanent and reliable credit source is 
smaller still. The proportion of the rural population with 
access to deposits and other financial services is smaller, too. 
Moreover, the ratio of agricultural credit to value added in 
agriculture increased from 10.5 percent in 1965 to 19.8 percent 
in 1976 and then declined, reaching at best levels much below 
those observed in other Latin American ·countries.!/ The insuffi-
ciency of this credit coverage has been further highlighted by a 
high degree of concentration of loan portfolios. 
Banco Agricola has been the only regulated institution 
with an important presence in the rural areas, with 31 branches 
scattered throughout the country. Up to 1983, however, it had 
been an incomplete financial institution, which disbursed loans 
but did not mobilize deposits, provide money-transfer services, 
store valuables, serve as fiduciary, or supply any other finan-
cial service. It had only been a "lending window" for external 
(foreign or Central Bank} funds, to be disbursed in order to meet 
lending targets, on terms and conditions determined by outsiders. 
It had been a conduit, not an intermediary, for funds moving only 
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in one direction. Authorized by its 1947 Charter to mobilize 
deposits from the public, it had faced no compulsion and received 
little incentive to do so. This structure undermined its 
financial viability. External funds came in waves, overloading 
the bank's capacity at that time, and leading to an irreversible 
expansion of its personnel, to be followed by acute scarcities 
of loanable funds. As a result, the institution did not offer 
farmers a reliable and permanent credit service. Absence of 
deposit facilities further prevented the development of "bank-
customer relationships," and limited the bank's access to market 
information, both crucial for a more efficient portfolio manage-
ment, and led to the alienation of the institution from its 
clientele. Banco Agricola generally projected the image of a 
political tool to favor particular constituencies, with frequent 
political intrusions undermining its financial viability. 
Political mandates and limited participation in project design 
weakened the bank's willingness to accept responsibility for 
collection. All of this contributed to severe default problems 
and to interest rate levels that did not allow the bank to cover 
costs, further accentuating its dependence on government 
transfers of funds to cover losses. 
In view of the recent financial crisis, however, this reli-
ance on public funds could not be continued. During the late 
1970s and early 1980s the Dominican Republic has been character-
ized by increasing public-sector deficits and by an even more 
rapid expansion of domestic credit in order to finance these 
deficits. As a result, an increasing proportion of domestic 
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credit has been allocated to the non-financial public sector and 
private producers have been "crowded out" of the loan portfolios 
of regulated intermediaries. This fiscal and credit expansion 
has resulted in a loss of the country's international monetary 
reserves, accelerated foreign-borrowing, inflation, and the deval-
uation of the D.R. peso. Inflation and devaluation expectations, 
coupled with interest-rate ceilings, have made the real returns 
on the assets issued by domestic financial institutions unattrac-
tive and the regulated financial system has experienced a drastic 
contraction, resulting in a reversal of the favorable financial-
deepening trends that the country had enjoyed for over two 
decades. on the other hand, the non-regulated and informal seg-
ments of the financial market have expanded considerably, thus 
reducing the volume of capital flight or the extent of currency 
substitution that otherwise would have been associated wit~ the 
repression of the regulated financial system. 
In effect, compared to other Latin American countries, the 
Dominican Republic seems to have always enjoyed relatively active 
non-regulated and informal financial activity. The recent explo-
sion of non-regulated intermediation, however, has been unprece-
dented and has further fragmented Dominican financial markets. 
Very high rates of interest have been paid for deposits in these 
non-regulated markets, averaging about 30 percent per year, while 
rates charged on loans have averaged 50 percent per year. In 
contrast, regulated institutions can not pay more than 18 percent 
per annum on deposits (and in many cases the ceiling is even more 
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constraining) and find their competitiveness for funds substan-
tially reduced.1/ 
This fiscal and monetary crisis has had significant conse-
quences for the financing of agriculture. credit volumes from 
regulated institutions, in real terms, have not contracted 
uniformly. Agricultural loans have suffered more than propor-
tionately, while many rural producers have been excluded from 
institutional portfolios, spilling over to other markets. Access 
to the urban non-regulated intermediaries has not been easy for 
rural producers. Interest rates have been very high and mortgages 
have been usually required from borrowers. With the share of the 
public sector in domestic credit increasing and limits on its 
total growth imposed by the stabilization program, Banco Agricola 
has lost access to the central Bank and other sources of redis-
counted funds (FIDE). Moreover, funds from international donors 
have not been forthcoming, in view of increasing delinquency and 
other operational difficulties, further reducing the supply of 
loanable funds for agricultural purposes. In addition, the volume 
of informal lending, that has always been important in the rural 
areas, has declined, as funds have been attracted by the high 
returns paid on deposits by non-regulated urban financial insti-
tutions, while marketing and other intermediaries, which usually 
retail funds in the countryside, have also been constrained by 
the liquidity crunch. This has been accentuated by the inability 
of the price-support institution (INESPRE) to pay for grain 
purchases. The crisis, therefore, has seriously diminished the 
supply of financial services in the rural areas. 
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III. Background: AID's Role in Agricultural Finance 
During the 1960s and the 1970s, the major international 
donors (AID, IDB, and IBRD) channelled substantial resources 
towards the Dominican agricultural sector. By the late 1970s, 
however, it was clear that the results of this foreign assistance 
were disappointing. Rural incomes had remained rela~ively low, 
while substantial migration to the main cities continued. The 
country was importing many staple commodities. This was explain-
ed in large part by the low profitability of crucial agricultural 
commodities, mostly as a result of price distortions. Inadequate 
provision of financial services was also part of the problem. A 
number of efforts had sought to improve the performance of Banco 
Agricola and to provide credit, on subsidized terms, to small 
farmers, but by 1979 dissatisfaction with the results of these 
programs led AID to give prelim~nary consideration to a major 
effort to assist the reform of rural financial markets.~/ 
Unfortunately, the 1979 hurricanes forced a redirection of atten-
tion towards more pressing problems of relief and reconstruction. 
In early 1980s, AID had become increasingly disappointed 
with Banco Agricola, in view of high borrower delinquency, ele-
vated operating costs, and lack of financial viability. Also, 
AID had accepted OSU's criticism of subsidized-credit programs, 
loan supervision and targeting, and specialized financial insti-
tutions. It was apparent, however, that raising interest rates 
without fundamental policy and financial-market reforms was 
impractical to negotiate, even it if was theoretically sound and 
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operationally workable.2/ The approach of offering funds for a 
credit program as leverage for interes~-ra~e reforms did not work. 
All of this led to a shift of the focus of the financial-reform 
controversy, from raising interest rates to mobilizing rural 
financial savings. The core of the new view was based on the 
notion that the rural population can save and thus generate funds 
for meeting other rural credit needs. To attract these funds, 
not only higher interest rates were needed, but also convenient, 
low-cost deposit facilities. It followed, of course, that higher 
rates must be charged on loans, but changes in the behavior 
of financial institutions were also required. The scope for 
intervention in rural financial markets was thus widened and the 
new view was thoroughly discussed at a workshop on Rural savings 
Mobilization at the Central Bank in October, 1982.~/ After the 
Workshop, AID, osu, and the Dominican authorities discussed the 
design of a Rural savings Mobilization Project. Emphasis shifted 
from an original interest in only experiments with credit unions, 
similar to those previously sponsored by osu and AID in Peru and 
Honduras, to participation by Banco Agricola and eventually other 
financial institutions in deposit mobilization. The local 
counterpart was also changed, from the Mi~istry of Agriculture 
to the central Bank, in an effort to call the attention of the 
monetary authorities towards the special problems of rural 
financial markets and to locate the project in a position to 
influence policy.~/ The project had a long gestation period of 
about a year. The grant agreement between AID and the Central 
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Bank was signed during the summer and the Project off~cially 
initiated operations on October 1, 1983. 
IV. Project Objectives and Activities 
The Project's main objective has been to improve the supply 
of financial services - deposits and loans - in the rural areas 
of the Dominican Republic. In particular, its purpose has been 
to strengthen those institutions that were providing some of 
those services or may do so in the future, and to promote 
changes in policies and procedures in order to increase the 
access of the rural population to financial services. 
The project was designed to include four types of closely 
linked activities: 
1. Pilot savings mobilization campaigns by Banco Agricola 
and selected credit unions. The purpose of this activity 
was to demonstrate that rural financial savings do exist and that 
they can be successfully mobilized, even under the present adverse 
economic circumstances. Also, the experiments were designed as 
I 
a learning exercise about the appropriate techniques to mobilize 
rural deposits in the Dominican Republic. It was hoped that this 
empirical evidence would facilitate the reform of policies that 
so far had been based on the assumption that such savings did not 
exist. 
2. Improvement of the financial management of Banco Agricola 
and selected credit unions. Deposit mobilization forces 
institutions to lend and recuperate loans more efficiently. 
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Liquidity and portfolio management, collection methods, and 
pricing policies had to be revised as a precondition for a 
successful mobilization effort. 
3. Establishment of a Dominican research capability on 
financial-market issues. The purpose was to enrich 
the policy dialogue and improve project design with results 
from locally-conducted research and the savings mobilization 
experiments. The belief was that Dominicans would be more 
inclined to accept the new ideas if their validity was confirmed 
by their own research. 
4. Dissemination of the results of the studies and institu-
tional experiments, in order to generate political 
support for the Project's objectives and methods. 
Technical assistance from osu was obtained through an add-on 
to the AID-OSU Cooperative Agreement on Rural savings for Capital 
Mobilization. osu provided the services of a project leader, a 
long-term advisor on savings mobilization, and short-term re-
search and consulting services. A Project coordination Office 
was established in the Financial Department at the central Bank. 10 
v. Project Implementation: Banco Agricola 
The establishment of deposit facilities at selected branches 
of Banco Agricola was preceded by long and complex preparations. 
This institution had no accumulated experience in mobilizing funds 
from the public and had no expertise in competing for them. This 
major step required the support of the bank's management and staff 
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and the belief that such efforts were both desirable and feasible. 
At the beginning, however, the idea encountered much skepticism 
among the bank's staff. Many feared that the Project's only objec-
tive was to force higher interest rates, with little net gain for 
the institution. A patient effort was required to convince them 
about the Project's broader scope and potential benefits. 
Preparation for deposit mobilization also included the 
design of manuals, policies, and procedures. Authorization had 
to be obtained from the Monetary Board, which had to set the 
interest rates to be paid as well as reserve requirements. 
Resolution XXX of the Monetary Board authorized Banco Agricola to 
issue passbook savings accounts and time certificates of deposit. 
Reserve requirements were set at 10 percent, but the bank 
voluntarily decided to keep a reserve of 20 percent during the 
earlier stages of the project. Interest rates of 6 percent per 
annum for savings accounts and of up to 10 percent per annum for 
time deposits were authorized. The Monetary Board imposed as 
conditions for its authorization that a separate accounting be 
used for these funds, that they be lent in the same region where 
they were mobilized, and that participating branches be chosen on 
the basis of efficiency criteria. Five branches were selected 
for the pilot effort on the basis of default ratios and admini-
stration costs, which were measured for the first time within the 
bank. In a few cases improvement of the branch's physical 
appearance and installation of a safe were required. Branch 
employees were trained on the new procedures, and an aggressive 
publicity campaign was conducted. 
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on July 2, 1983 Banco Agricola initiated its deposit 
mobilization activities at its branch in La Vega. One at a time, 
deposit services were offered in other branches, at intervals 
of about two weeks. soon the institution decided to expand the 
pilot effort to more branches than had originally been planned. 
Within three months, the project was operating in nine branches, 
and the management of Banco Agricola indicated that it desired 
to expand the service rapidly.ll/ The osu team had to face the 
issue of the optimum speed of expansion of the system. In the 
original project design, deposit mobilization was an experiment 
involving only a few branches, in order to learn about the con-
ditions under which deposits can be best mobilized and the changes 
in policies and procedures that are required. The decision 
to proceed more rapidly presented both opportunities and danger. 
The team recommended caution.ll/ Although there were economies 
of scale from the expansion, the design of the effort was still 
experimental. The bank had not adopted the operational and 
structural changes required for success, whose absence might 
have reduced the quality of the service. To the extent that 
confidence is a major incentive for depositors, such a deterio-
ration might have resulted in a run on the bank and the failure 
of the mobilization efforts. Given the management's political 
decision, however, osu decided to take advantage of this enthu-
siasm, while attempting to immediately face the new challenges. 
What became clear after a few weeks of operation was that 
rural financial savings did exist and that the bank was attract-
ing them. At the same time, even at a relatively small scale of 
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operation, several complications soon appeared. These second-
generat~on problems became more acute as the dimensions of the 
mobil~zation effort increased. This was not surpr~sing or to~ally 
unwelcome. It had been expected -hoped- that the deposit mobili-
zat~on activity would create imbalances and tensions with~n the 
bank, and bring to light deficiencies that would necessitate cor-
rection, and that this, in turn, would force the institution to 
evaluate its own performance from new perspectives, leading to 
major changes in organization and policies. That is, the proJect 
was conceived as a "Trojan Horse, 11 which would result in institu-
tional strengthening "from within," in response to the disequi-
libria created by deposit mobilization. Given the rapid expansion 
and much larger dimensions of the mobilization efforts, however, 
the second-generation problems appeared earlier and with greater 
urgency of solution than had been expected. Fortunately, the 
willingness to rapidly expand the service was matched by a desire 
to support many of the reforms required.1l/ 
The addition of the deposit mobilization activities, with-
out increasing branch staff, for instance, had created massive 
information requirements which some branches found difficult to 
face. A separate accounting system and reports to the Central 
Office on the daily evolution of the accounts were required; 
interest was compounded daily. That is, the project created 
a 11 problem, 11 that made deficiencies of the bank's information 
system evident. The solution involved a revised, integrated 
accounting and data-management system, the installation of 
microcomputers, etc.l!/ 
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It has become ~ncreas~ngly clear that Banco Agricola has 
been fac~ng significant difficulties in lending out the funds 
mobilized, mostly as a result of the severe restr~ctions imposed 
upon borrower elegibility by the bank's Board of Directors. This 
has reflected fears based on the institution's historic delin-
quency problems, as well as a -desired- change in attitude. Both 
the Board and branch managers have been less willing to lose the 
funds when they did not come from AID or the Central Bank but 
from their neighbors. The slow lending of the funds, in turn, 
has reduced the willingness of some branch managers to actively 
promote deposit mobilization. These problems and the high cost 
of accumulated excess liquidity have led to some loosening of the 
lending requirements, in order to permit a more rapid turnover of 
the funds, but this has not been enough. osu has been arguing 
about the need for more decentralization and increased responsi-
bility for branch managers. The Project has supplied substantial 
training inputs for this purpose, in order to modify the rigid 
and paternalistic management style that characterized the bank in 
the past. The new attitude about repayment, moreover, has 
spilled over to the whole portfolio of the bank. New client 
classification and portfolio management criteria have been 
designed and the more active collection efforts have resulted in 
improved recuperation indexes. 
Change within the institution has been taking place rapidly 
and on many fronts. Inevitably, not all of the changes have been 
fully understood, accepted, and internalized by the bank's staff. 
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osu has been involved in a major effort in train~ng and in tech-
nical assistance in human-resource management, in order to con-
solidate the reforms. Several workshops on managerial attitudes 
and techniques have been conducted. In September, the savings-
mobilization office was upgraded to a department level, fully 
integrating the Project with the overall operations of the bank. 
Expansion of the system continued rapidly and by April, 1985 
the new deposit services were offered at 21 of the bank's 31 
branches, while the second-generation problems were still being 
addressed. In April, Banco Agricola started the implementation 
of a quarterly raffle among depositors, in order to make the 
services more attractive. one account has been chosen from each 
of the participating branches and the winner's balance has been 
doubled, up to a maximum of DR $5,000. This incentive has 
apparently attracted much interest in the accounts. 
VI. Project Implementation: credit Unions 
In the earlier stages of the Project, many credit unions 
were investigated, in order to select those five that would 
participate in the pilot savings campaigns. Preparation efforts 
at the credit unions were even more arduous and costly than at 
Banco Agricola, given their very weak institutional structure. 
In addition, the whole membership had to be convinced about 
the modifications of policies and organization (mainly interest 
rates and collection procedures) required for successful deposit 
mobilization. This gestation period lasted about a year. The 
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accouncing system of these credit unions requ~red substancial 
improvement, as previously they only managed to close their books 
once a year. Parcial subsidies have been provided to cover the 
added administrative and promotional expenditures required, but 
they have been relatively minor and temporary. Substantial 
progress in delinquency control has also resulted from the 
portfolio-management system designed by the Project and from the 
credit unionsr improved image. Borrowers have found it attrac-
tive to become clients in good standing, in the expectation of 
larger loans in the future. Major training efforts have been 
directed toward credit union leaders and staff, while three 
Dominican technicians have been trained and have actively 
participated in all of these efforts. 
In spite of the delays due to the lengthy preparation 
effort, by December, 1984 four credit unions were successfully 
mobilizing deposits. One attractive dimension of this other 
experiment has been greater flexibil~ty in their interest-rate 
policies. The interest rates on deposits of two of the partici-
pating credit unions have closely resembled those paid in the 
non-regulated segment of the financial market; however, due to 
their nature as mutual organizations, where the clients are at 
the same time the owners, and due to economies of scope and of 
scale, the rates charged on loans have still been far below those 
charged by informal moneylenders. 
Desp1te an initial build up of excess liqu~dity, as a result 
of conservative lending policies in combination w~th successful 
~ 
deposit mobilization, this problem was rapidly resolved in the 
- 18 -
credit union case, as their administrators became more adept in 
credit analysis. On the contrary, given the limited availab~lity 
of financial serv~ces where they operate and the generalized 
liquidity crunch, as the image of the credit unions has improved, 
they have faced a substantial unsatisfied demand for credit, even 
at rates substuntially higher than those charged at present. 
VII. Project Implementation: Research and Dissemination 
The Project's research activities have been implemented 
through three generations of research projects, designed and 
evaluated at an equal number of major workshops. The First 
workshop on Rural Savings Mobilization in the Dom~nican Republic 
was conducted in early November, 1983 in Puerto Plata, with 
representatives from all participating institutions, in order to 
evaluate and improve the research proposals prepared by a dozen 
Dominican institutions. In order to provide a conceptual frame-
work and criteria for the research efforts, a concepts paper and 
several technical notes were prepared.lil Those responsible for 
the projects were visited periodically by the osu team during 
the following year, until completion. 
The Second Puerto Plata Workshop was conducted in October, 
1984 in order to review the results from the first year of 
research activities and plan for a second generation of research 
projects. The progress of the pilot savings mobilization efforts 
and proposals for financial reform were also discussed.1i/ The 
results from the second year and planning for a third generation 
of projects were the topic of the Third Puerto Plata Workshop 
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that took place in September, 1985.12/ The amount of research 
sponsored has been substantial. Dissemination has included 
numerous minor workshops, lectures by osu staff, seminars, 
publications, etc. About 120 papers, research and progress 
reports, technical notes, and policy reform proposals have 
been written within the Project. (See list of publications). 
VIII. Project Results 
Major achievements associated with the Banco Agricola 
component of the Project have included the establishment of the 
Deposit Mobilization Department, with a full-time staff of five 
persons, that has effectively participated in the design, 
implementation, and monitoring of the savings campaigns. overall, 
the new activity has resulted in the addition of only three 
employees to the bank's total staff. several organizational 
changes to improve efficiency have included new forms for 
reporting information, computer programs for data management, a 
new system of portfolio and client classification, and better 
collection procedures. Microcomputers are being introduced and 
major training efforts have been undertaken. The bank has 
modified its interest-rate policies, raising loan rates to the 
maximum level allowed and making them more uniform. 
The bank has steadily expanded its deposit services to 9 of 
its 31 branches and to six "satellite" offices linked to rural 
branches. By the end of October, 1985 total deposits amounted to 
DR $6,958,094 (US $2.4 million), of which 58 percent was ac-
counted by passbook savings accounts and 42 percent by time 
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deposits (See Tables 1 and 2). This represented 20,539 sav~ngs 
accounts and 274 time deposits. The average balance of a 
savings account was DR $194 (US $67), and the average size of a 
time deposit DR $10,824. The small size of the savings accounts 
reflects the demand for this service from thousands of small 
depositors. Average mobilization per branch was DR $240,000. 
August to August, the number of accounts had increased by 133.5 
percent and the amount mobilized by 57.1 percent. 
Deposit mobilization among the credit unions has also been 
strong. In Vallejuelo, savings accounts increased from DR $3,554 
(March 1984) to $37,465 (August 1985) and DR $18,500 of time 
deposits, not used previously, were added. During the same 
period delinquency declined from 71 to 10 percent of the port-
folio. In Santa Lucia, savings accounts, offered for the first 
time since November, 1984, amounted to DR $67,523 by July, 1985. 
Delinquency declined from 48 percent (December 1983) to 7 percent 
(July 1985). In La Vega, savings accounts increased from DR 
$4,427 (December 1983) to DR $35,294 (July 1985), while DR $9,960 
of the new time deposits were added. Delinquency declined from 
45 percent (December 1984) to 15 percent (December 1985). In San 
Jose de Las Matas, savings accounts increased from DR $305,541 
(January 1985) to DR $693,791 (May 1985) and time deposits grew 
from DR $418,278 to DR $779,554 in the same period. This cooper-
ative was already successful, following policies similar to those 
promoted by the Project, but has experienced a substantial 
expansion since. Its volume of operations has become so large 
that the Project advisors have recommended the introduction of a 
microcomputer. 
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Table l. DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION AT BANCO AGRICOLA 
August March August october 
1984 1985 1985 1985 
1. Branches 
participating 7 21 29 29 
2. Number of accounts: 1,160 7,441 17,376 20,813 
savings 1,140 7,297 17,110 20,539 
Time deposits 20 144 266 274 
3. Amounts (DR$ '000) 434 4,017 6,309 6,958 
savings 1,574 3,377 3,992 
Time deposits 2,443 2,932 2,966 
4. Average per Branch 
Number of accounts 166 354 599 718 
Amount (DR$ '000) 62 191 218 240 
s. Average size of 
deposit (DR $) 374 540 363 334 
savings 216 197 194 
Time deposits 16,997 11,022 10,824 
Source: Internal Banco Agricola records. DR $2.90 make us $1. 
- 22 -
Table 2. DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION AT BANCO AGRICOLA 
OCTOBER 31, 1985 
SAVINGS TIME DEPOSITS TOTAL 
BRANCHES NUMBER AMOUNT NUMBER AMOUNT NUMBER AMOUNT 
santo Domingo 713 109,871 13 827,059 726 936,930 
Higuey 829 129,806 3 29,708 832 159,514 
san Cristobal 634 26,839 6 3,530 640 30,369 
San J. Maguana 1110 145,495 2 4,765 1112 150,260 
comendador 882 257,603 7 8,287 889 265,890 
cotui 1008 106,694 58 115,128 1066 110,224 
La Vega 1629 250,975 29 217,931 1658 468,906 
Santiago Rodr. 335 80,874 6 177,514 341 258,388 
Puerto Plata 1287 229,379 50 164,640 1337 394,019 
Nagua 424 42,922 1 5,973 425 48,895 
E1 Seybo 480 184,901 8 10,941 488 195,842 
santiago 774 86,808 6 54,080 780 251,448 
san J. ocoa 746 59,725 2 58,105 748 117,830 
Azua 627 163,791 3 4,.542 630 168,333 
Bani 1061 122,298 9 304,923 1070 427,221 
Valverde 534 95,835 9 186,369 543 282,204 
Maca 289 165,807 4 41,006 293 206,813 
Dajabon 530 77,836 4 67,265 534 382,759 
san J. Matas 1001 388,452 8 409,619 1009 798,071 
Rio San Juan 1083 304,331 14 59,608 1097 363,939 
Salcedo 751 204,601 8 137,855 759 342,456 
Bonae 716 81,119 5 10,500 721 91,619 
Are no so 673 131,475 2 5,500 675 136,975 
Barahona 373 55,168 0 0 373 193,023 
Montecristy 253 64,398 2 5,100 255 69,498 
Hato Mayor 262 31,292 2 10,500 264 41,792 
Samana 477 185,878 2 21,000 479 185,878 
Villa Riva 326 88,064 2 2,165 328 90,229 
Monte Plata 732 120,131 9 22,113 741 142,244 
Total 20,539 3,992,368 274 2,965,726 20,813 6,958,094 
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The Project has promoted a substantial amount of research 
act~v~ty, us~ng PL-480 local currency, and has made importane 
inroads ~nto institutionaliz~ng research un~ts within the Central 
Bank, Banco Agricola, and several universities. During the first 
year, 8 research projects were completed and 6 more were added 
during the second year, to investigate rural informal financial 
markets, urban nonregulated financ~al inseitutions, the evaluation 
of agricultural credit projects, depositor behavior, lending 
costs, the implementation of savings campaigns, the interaction 
between foreign-exchange and financial markets, the role of 
financial regulation, and problems of financial reform, among 
several other topics. Research results have been an effective 
instrument for policy dialogue and problem-solving innovations in 
the participating institutions. As claimed by the project's 
evaluators, "The combination of public discussion, research by 
Dominican investigators, and operational innovation by Dominican 
institutions--all supported and encouraged by flexible technical 
assistance and financial arrangements--is a powerful model for 
assistance.nl8/ 
IX. LESSONS LEARNED 
Many lessons have already been learned from the Dominican 
experiment in rural deposit mobilization. The most important one 
has been the confirmation that financial institutions can attract 
deposits in the rural areas of low income countries, even under 
adverse economic circumstances. Substantial volumes of funds have 
been deposited with Banco Agricola and the credit unions by 
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relacively small rural economic agents. This reflects the 
exiscence of a demand for deposit facilit~es, a valuable service 
not ava~lable before in the rural areas. The reduction of 
transaction costs for potential depositors, particularly in remote 
communities where other deposit services are not available, seems 
to be the most important inducement. Households and firms need to 
hold cash and reserves for liquidity, risk, emergency/ and 
investment management. Households without deposit alternatives 
are forced to invest in real assets, even at high risks and low 
returns. (The loss of the rural savings incorporated in pigs 
because of the African swine fever epidemic is a dramatic example 
in the Dominican context). Availability of these deposit options 
has improved rural welfare, as shown by the revealed preference of 
thousands of depositors, who have voluntarily chosen to use the 
service. The lottery, simple procedures for frequent deposits and 
withdrawals, the compounding of interest, and the expectation of a 
future loan have also been important incentives. 
Development banks and other institutions with an established 
network of branches can mobilize rural deposits at a relatively 
low marginal cost, by using their underutilized installed infra-
structure. Deposit mobilization, however, is not easy. The 
operation of deposit facilities by an agricultural development 
bank that has not offered these services must be preceded by a 
gestation period of complex preparation. An effective mobiliza-
tion will not be accomplished unless the authorities, management, 
and staff of the institution are convinced that the efforts are 
desirable and feasible. Several methods may be used to bring 
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about this understandlng of the need for and beneflts of deposit 
mobilizatlon. The myth that the rural population does not possess 
assets that may be transformed into deposlts and does not have a 
margin over consumption for further accumulation needs to be 
questioned. Evidence has to be provided in order to show that 
potential depositors do respond to higher returns, lower trans-
actions costs, greater security and liquidity, and other economlc 
incentives. The bank's management must understand the problems 
associated with subsidized credit, high default rates, and 
dependence on outside financing if internal opposition is to be 
effectively dealt with. 
Similarly, political support for institutional and policy 
reforms must be obtained both from the domestic authorities and 
major international donors. This is particularly crucial with 
respect to central banks, which will usually be requested to 
authorize the mobilization efforts and to set interest-rate 
structures, reserve requirements, and other determinants of the 
profitability of deposits. Technical assistance may play an 
important role in initiating thinking about the benefits of 
deposit mobilization, but local involvement in this process is 
crucial. In the Dominican Republic, a combination of public 
discussion over the years, research by Dominicans, in-depth policy 
dialogue, and operational innovations on a pilot basis, supported 
and encouraged by flexible technical assistance, proved to be a 
powerful model for change. The deteriorating financial situation 
of the 1980s and the harsh reality of more restrictive access to 
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traditional sources of funds created the requ~red economic 
incentives for the new activities. 
Deposit mobilization, moreover, usually forces the inter-
mediary to face new dilemmas about strategy and organization; that 
is, it becomes necessary to deal with a set of nsecond-generation" 
problems. The need to keep records and to calculated interest on 
the savings accounts frequently places additional burdens on the 
personnel and may overload existing information systems, possibly 
bringing to light its deficiencies and inducing a modernization. 
Experiments with microcomputers, to reduce data management costs, 
may be tried. Branch managers must quickly turn around the funds 
mobilized into loans, given their cost, in order to maintain 
profitability. In view of the source of these funds, branch 
managers must try to lend to clients who demonstrate a high 
probability of repayment. Given previous experiences with high 
delinquency, these managers have to learn to make lending deci-
sions quickly, while still being very selective among borrowers. 
As a result, the institution is faced with a revision of its 
portfolio management techniques. With a new awareness about 
profitability, the intermediary also recognizes the need to reduce 
the costs associated with deposit and loan operations and with 
delinquency and finds it necessary to revise pricing policies in 
order to increase revenue from interest. In the case of Banco 
Agricola, all of this brought about changes in institutional 
structure, policies, and procedures, and rained fundamental 
questions about national financial policies and regulations. 
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In general, the introduction of deposit mobilization activ-
ities in a rural financial institution creates imbalances and 
brings to light deficiencies that necessitate correction. If 
successful, the experiment will lead to a global evaluation and 
restructuring of the intermediary and to a revision of policies, 
thus increasing institutional viability and improving the quality 
of the financial services provided in rural areas. Changes in 
information and data management systems, the degree of operational 
decentralization, portfolio management and delinquency control, 
and standards of administrative efficiency may be needed, possibly 
requiring a reconsideration of the institution's human resources 
and incentives strategy and considerable amounts of training. All 
of these changes, however, may be among the most important 
contribution of a rural deposit mobilization experiment. 
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